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Recent Developments

Johnson v. State:
Maryland Rule 4-204 Requires the Defendant's Consent if the State Makes a
Substantive Change to a Charging Document
By Ingrid Abbott

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that
Maryland Rule 4-204 requires the
defendant's consent if the State
makes a substantive change to a
charging document. Johnson v.
State, 358 Md. 384, 749 A.2d 769
(2000). The court held that
amending information to substitute
"cocaine" for "marijuana" was a
change of substance rather than form
because it changed the character of
the offense charged. Moreover, the
court held that such an amendment is
prejudicial ifthe defendant does not
consent.
On June 20, 1997, Officer
Mark Waltrop ("Waltrop") arrested
the defendant, Steve Johnson
("Johnson"), after observing
Johnson with what appeared to be
crack cocaine. Accordingly, police
charged Johnson with possession of
crack cocaine with intent to
distribute, possession of crack
cocaine, and possession of a firearm
in violation of Md. Ann. Code art.
27, section281A (1957, 1996 Repl.
Vol.).
In August 1997, the State's
Attorney filed a five-count criminal .
information in the Circuit Court for
Talbot County. However, instead of
charging Johnson with possession of
cocaine, count one ofthe information
charged Johnson with possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, and

count two with unlawful possession of
marijuana. The other counts were
identical with the initial charges. In
December 1997, the State moved to
amend counts one and two of the
information to charge Johnson with
possession of cocaine instead of
marijuana. Johnson refused to
consent to the change. At a January
1998 hearing, Johnson contended that
the State's proposed amendment
violated Maryland Rule 4-204
because it changed the character of
the offense charged and therefore
required his consent.
After the circuit court granted the
State's motion, Johnson was
convicted on all counts and sentenced.
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed the trial court's
decision to grant the motion to amend.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari to determine
whether the amendment ofcounts one
and two of the charging document
violated Maryland Rule 4-204.
The court of appeals observed
that under Maryland Rule 4-204, a
court may permit an amendment to
a charging document, "except that
if the amendment changes the
character of the offense charged, the
consent of the parties is required."
!d. at 387, 749 A.2d at 770. Next,
the court examined the history ofRule
4-204, noting that it was derived from
Article 52, section 22 of the 1957

Maryland Code, which allowed the
amendment of criminal informations
and warrants, if the amendment did
not change the character of the
offense or crime with which the
accused was charged. !d. at 388,
749 A.2d at 771 (citing Md. Ann.
Code art. 52, section22 (1957)).
Additionally, in 1961, section
22 of Article 52 was replaced by
former Maryland Rule 714 that
applied "form versus substance"
language to indictments and
informations, and "character ofthe
offense" language to warrants. !d.
Subsequent amendments to Rule
714 alternated between a
"character of the offense" and
"form versus substance" approach
for indictments and informations.
!d. Rule 714 was renumbered as
Rule 713 and amended in 1979 to
allow amendments to indictments if
the amendments did not "change the
substance ofthe indictment." !d. In
1984, the current version of the
statute, Md. Rule 4-204, was
enacted. Id.
Next, the court reviewed its
prior decisions that examined
whether amendments to charging
documents changed the elements of
the original crime charged. The court
noted that whether it used the "form
versus substance" or "character of
the offense" test, the controlling factor
in its analysis was always whether the
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amendment constituted a "matter of
form." !d. In Thanos v. State, 282
Md. 709,387 A.2d286 (1979), the
original charge of shoplifting could be
committed by altering or removing a
label or price tag. !d. The amendment
substituted "remove" for the word
"alter" without the defendant's
consent. !d. at 388-89, 749 A.2d at
771 (citing Thanos, 282 Md. at 716,
387 A.2d at 290). Here the court
applied both tests, and held that the
amendment was not "simply a matter
ofform" where "it is equally clear that
the basic description ofthe offense is
indeed changed when an entirely
different act is alleged to constitute the
crime." !d.
Similarly, in Brown v. State, 285
Md. 105,400A.2d 1133 (1979), the
amendment substituted the words
"one Ford Automobile" to
"$5462.80," thereby changing the
identity ofthe property the defendant
allegedly obtained by false
pretenses. !d. at 389, 749 A.2d at
772. The court held that the
amendment
constituted
a
substantive change because it
affected the essential facts that
would prove whether the defendant
had committed a crime. !d. (citing
Brown, 285 Md. at 109, 400 A.2d
at 1135-36).
In the case at bar, the court
found that the amendment
significantly
changed
the
description ofthe specific act charged.
!d. at 390, 749 A.2d at 772. Instead
of charging the defendant with
possession of marijuana, the charge
was now possession of cocaine. !d.
Like the amendments in Thanos and
Brown, the amended information in
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Johnson changed the "character of
the offense alleged." !d. In so holding,
the court rejected the State's argument
that the character of the offense was
not changed because both offenses
were governed by the same sections
of the controlled dangerous
substance statute before and after the
amendment. !d. Moreover, the
Thanos court recognized that a
charging document "may not be
amended to charge an act not alleged
in the original document..." !d. (citing
Thanos 282 Md. at 715, 387 A.2d
at 289).
The court also cited
Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182,
567 A.2d 126 (1989), which held
that the legislature intended to
regulate each type of controlled
substance and to authorize a
separate conviction for possession
of each substance in sections 286
and 287 of the controlled dangerous
substance statute. !d. at 391, 749
A.2d at 772 (citing Cunningham,
318 Mdat 187-88,567 A.2dat 12829). Turning to the case at bar, the
court noted that penalties for
possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute and possession ofmarijuana
with intent to distribute varied
significantly. !d. Additionally, because
identification ofa controlled substance
must be considered an element ofthe
crime, the State must prove the
particular type of substance it has
allegedinordertoconvict. !d. at391392, 749 A.2d at 773 (citing
Simpson, 318 Md. at 198-99, 567
A.2d at 133-34).
In the instant case, the court
ruled that because the amendment
changes the identity of a controlled

dangerous substance, the defendant
is effectively charged with a
different offense and the amendment
is invalid. !d. at 392, 749 A.2d at
773.
Rejecting the State's
contention that amending the
information was not prejudicial, the
court opined that the purpose of
Rule 4-204 was to prevent any
unfair surprise to the defendant, and
to allow the defendant and his
counsel to adequately prepare for
trial. !d. Accordingly, the court of
appeals determined that the
amendment was prejudicial
because it changed the character of
the offense by substituting "cocaine"
for "marijuana" without the
defendant's consent.
The decision in Johnson sends
a message, loud and clear, that both
the letter and intent of Rule 4-204
must be followed. The court has
clearly delineated the standard by
which amendments to charging
documents are to be assessed. If
the amendment alters the elements
ofthe crime with which a defendant
is charged, the change is substantive.
The State must obtain the accused's
or her consent or face the prospect
of reversal on appeal. In the future,
prosecutors must ensure that the
charging document accurately
reflects the charges the State intends
to prosecute. This ruling preserves
the defendant's right to withhold
consent to an amendment that
changes the offense charged, and
signals defense attorneys to
carefully monitor any proposed
amendments made by the
prosecution once the initial charging
document is completed.

